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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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What Are Prospects for Arab Unity?

by Don Peretz

Often in the Arab East the boundary line between myth and reality is imperceptible to those from the Western world. But such is hardly the case with the line which divides the reality of Arab unity from the ever growing sentiment in its favor. Although today the reality of unity is as remote as it has been since the movement became popular, the sentiment for some form of federation is all-pervasive throughout the Arab East.

Efforts to unify the area date back to antiquity when the first Egyptian-Asiatic League was formed before 1400 B.C. In the modern era the first popular sentiment for unity developed after the Arab awakening in the latter part of the 19th century. During World War II the idea of Arab unification was revived by the British with the objective of bringing the Arab world together under the Hashemite dynasty. Prime Minister Nuri As-Said of Iraq took the lead in proposing a union of Arab countries exclusive of those in the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt. The plan was opposed by Egypt—traditional center of Arab nationalism—which itself wanted to take the lead in the unity movement; by King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, who opposed the leadership of

his Hashemite rivals; and by Syria and Lebanon, which were jealous of their newly won independence from France.

After two years of negotiations the center of the unity movement was shifted to Egypt in 1944. On September 25 at a meeting in Alexandria, attended by Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Egypt, a protocol was signed setting forth the aims and proposed constitution of the Arab League. Six months later the new organization was formally launched when the Arab League Pact was signed by these same nations in Cairo.

Since its creation 13 years ago the Arab League has been the formal center of the unity movement. Although it has many accomplishments to its credit in the way of economic, social and cultural activities, it has been plagued by lack of political success. Most notable was the Arab failure to prevent the establishment of Israel in 1948 despite the existence of the league.

Since their defeat in the Palestine war there has been much self-searching and re-examination of the concepts of unity and nationalism among Arab leaders. The league has fallen

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into disrepute among many, who have nevertheless sought some other road to unity. Others feel that although the league is not a perfect instrument through which to achieve their goal, it is the best and therefore the most useful created to date.

The Idea

There is no doubt that the idea of some form of Arab unification has become all-pervasive in the Arab world. Only among some Christian groups in Lebanon is the idea not stimulating. They feel that the special prerogatives they now enjoy would be jeopardized were Lebanon to be swallowed up in a federation or state in which the vast majority of people would be Muslim.

Nearly every other Arab political group or party in the area cites unification among its chief aims. From the extreme nationalist Muslim Brotherhood on the right through the left-oriented Socialist Resurrection, or Baath, party, unity is a primary goal. The idea of Arab unity is popular with students, journalists and most professionals connected with the nationalist movement. But there have been few steps toward realization of this aspiration. Talk of unity is more the expression of an inchoate sentiment than a discussion of the political scientist's blueprint for some form of constitutional structure.

Adoption of Arab unity as one of the aspirations of the revolution in Egypt gave impetus to the sentiment throughout the Asian-Arab nations. President Gamal Abdel Nasser has

become for millions of Arabs in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq the symbol of unity. Prior to his ascent to power the idea often received but bland acknowledgement rather than enthusiastic support because the movement lacked a strong and popular unifying force.

But what about the reality of Arab unity in the near future? It will take more than sentiment and dramatic appeal to overcome the many tangible obstacles to real unification. Political, economic and social differences will continue to keep the Arab world divided for many years.

Politically, present Arab governments are split between two camps. On one extreme are those which, like Syria, are so obsessed with fear of "Western imperialism" that to many Western observers they seem to be following a pro-Soviet policy. Only a short while ago many of these same observers feared that Egypt was following a similar line. But now it seems that Egypt is searching for a more truly "positive neutralism."

On the other side of the political spectrum are those governments which have chosen to join the Western camp. As of today they include, in varying degrees of identification, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Iraq is most committed through its membership in the Baghdad pact. But the policies of governments in the Middle East are indeed transitory. Only a few months ago both Jordan and Saudi Arabia were part of the Egyptian-Syrian alliance. It would be idle to speculate just how or for how long they will be

able to steer their present course.

Much more effective obstacles to unity than the policies of present governments are the differences in political structure and the economic and social barriers which cut across the Arab world. Even the present international trade pattern of the Arab world is not developing in a direction which would be conducive to unity. It now trades more beyond its borders than among its component members.

The Reality

True, through the Arab League there has been discussion of many mutual economic and social problems. There is even a fairly large exchange of specialists and technicians; and on the diplomatic level Palestinians have represented Syria, Egyptians have been spokesmen for Yemen, and diplomats of Lebanese nationality have been accredited by Saudi Arabia. These things indicate that there is a strong basis for Arab unity. Even more important is the popular sentiment for unity which cannot be expunged by mere shifts in government policy. But present Middle East realities show that the dream is far from fulfillment and that prospects for Arab unity in the mid-20th century are remote indeed.

Dr. Peretz is research director of Regional Research Analysts, an organization for area studies in economic, political and social affairs. In 1947-48 he covered the Arab-Israel conflict as a radio and newspaper correspondent. From 1952 to 1954 Dr. Peretz studied tensions in the Middle East with the aid of a Ford Foundation grant, and also spent the summer of 1957 in the area.

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India's Politics: Middle Course or Polarization?

NEW DELHI — The monsoon season, with its sudden daily downpours and brief intervals of clearing when the cloud-burdened sky is suddenly irradiated with fresh-washed azure and gold, has a dual psychological effect.

The seemingly ceaseless rain, beneficent as it is for India's urgently needed crops, can also wreak havoc as rising rivers flood the countryside and sweep away homes. The immobilization of physical activity encourages, at worst, passivity, and at best, a spirit of contemplation. But when the sun breaks through, spirits rise. The prospect of a good harvest stirs hope. People who had just been taking refuge in doorways or huddling under the huge black umbrellas, which give a funereal air to monsoon-swept streets, come out to enjoy the respite; and the landscape blooms with the women's colorful saris.

Ten years after independence India is in a monsoon mood. It feels neither the elation of 1947, when with the departure of the British it looked confidently to its future as a free nation; nor the sense of expectation generated by the launching of the First Five-Year Plan in 1951.

New Struggle for Freedom

A decade of profound change and often painful readjustments has left its imprint on India. It is now clearly realized that independence from foreign rule marked, not the end, but the beginning of the new nation's struggle for freedom. The political revolution which united India against Britain is seen as the first stage of a long and arduous process which must bring an economic and social revolution if India is to garner the fruits of its efforts and not have

them swept away in a torrent of internal conflicts.

India's mood today is sober—among some, even somber. There is a sense of pessimism, of frustration, as the myriad problems of building a united nation and modernizing an underdeveloped economy emerge in all their starkness, no longer veiled in the haze of nationalist emotion.

Rise in Criticism

At no time since 1947 has there been such widespread criticism of the government as one hears and reads today—criticism about food shortages and rising prices, about white-collar unemployment and obsolete methods of education, about alleged shortcomings of the Second Five-Year Plan, about corruption among bureaucrats, and even about foreign policy, hitherto regarded as above the political battle. Particularly striking is the extent to which Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru is taken to task on various counts—most frequently for this tendency to center all important decisions in his own hands, with a consequent dangerous delay, critics claim, in performance of the nation's business at a time of crisis.

Yet these criticisms are a healthy sign of a new awareness that the nation's business is not just the concern of government leaders in New Delhi, no matter how popular or competent, but of all the people. And this means 360 million—320 million Hindus and 40 million Muslims—living in a land of widely varying climes, speaking at least 14 major languages, practicing two major religious faiths, with distinctions in castes, customs and traditions still

persisting, in spite of constitutional provisions against castes in particular and of valiant efforts to substitute loyalty to the nation for parochial, linguistic and religious loyalties.

Nor should criticism of Nehru be interpreted abroad as indicating the decline of his influence and the near disintegration of his rule. Whatever else may be said about India, it remains today what it set out to be in 1947—a genuine democracy functioning under Asian conditions, determined to develop its backward economy by voluntary means, not by force. And Nehru, who in the first flush of excitement about independence might easily have assumed the role of a dictator, continues to be the symbol and the chief spokesman of his countrymen's democratic faith—in spite of his own impatience with his critics.

As one watches him day after day in Parliament answering members' questions with interest and frequent flashes of humor, or standing erect in the drenching rain on the ramparts of the Red Fort on August 15, Independence Day, to address a vast crowd, one realizes anew the truth of Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1928 remark: "There is no magic in democracy that does away with the need for leadership."

Which Way?

To thoughtful Indians the question of the day is not, as Americans often put it, "After Nehru, what?" Other leaders will emerge in case of need, these Indians say. Rather, the real question is which way India will go politically in the next five years, admitted by all to be critical for the future of democracy here.

Nehru's Congress party indisputably represents the majority of the voters, as shown by the results of the general elections of 1951 and 1957—but the prime minister is the first to recognize that in 1957 his party began to show signs of slipping in popularity, failing to gain a majority in two state assemblies—those of Kerala and Orissa. Congress suffers from the weaknesses of its own initial strength. Born out of the National Congress, the over-all organization that rallied all political faiths except the Communists in the struggle against Britain, it is now an inchoate, cumbersome party whose members range from conservative landowners and industrialists to believers in various degrees of socialism, among them Prime Minister Nehru.

What Is India's Socialism?

The socialism advocated by Congress, to be brought about in a "welfare state" by cooperation between government and people, is not the clearly formulated ideology of European socialists, but a pragmatic concept of "social justice" which lends itself to a variety of individual interpretations. This concept has as its core a planned economy, but an economy that is "mixed," consisting of a public and a private sector. The central government serves to give a sense of direction; but it exercises no significant controls, as indicated by the problems that have arisen about agricultural underproduction and alleged overissuance of import licenses requiring the use of foreign exchange, now in short supply.

The very fact, however, that Congress professes to support socialism prevents the emergence of a solidly based Socialist party, which under other circumstances might become an effective opposition as in Britain or West Germany. Of the principal So-

cialist leaders, the most popular and promising, Jaya Prakash Narayan, deserted politics in 1953, contending that intraparty bickering was unsuited to India's critical conditions, and joined the Bhoodan (land gift) movement led by Gandhi's disciple, Acharya Vinoba Bhave. And Asoka Mehta, the party's most acute theoretician, also deprecating the struggle for political advantages, has been cooperating with the Nehru government, most recently as chairman of the Food Committee, which is slated to play an important part in future plans for agricultural development.

With the line between Congress and the Socialists becoming increasingly blurred, there is little prospect that the Socialists can provide an alternative to the Congress. Instead, Jaya Prakash Narayan and Asoka Mehta might conceivably return to the Congress fold, from which they departed after independence, and even win national offices. It was only four years ago that Nehru was negotiating with Narayan with a view to grooming him as his successor. These negotiations were blocked at the time by Congress right-wingers. But now that the Socialist leader is reported to be somewhat disillusioned with the effectiveness of the Bhoodan movement as an instrument of economic and social change, and Congress recognizes the need for fresh, younger leadership, the merger of at least the bulk of the Socialists with Congress is in the realm of possibility.

If the merger takes place and if Congress, alarmed by its loss of influence at the grass roots, rids itself of the corruption, nepotism and complacency which have crept into its ranks, the middle group in India's political spectrum would be broadened and strengthened. Should these changes occur, Congress is given a good chance of holding power for

the next decade. It could then become a center or slightly left-of-center party. The Communists would then be at one end; and perhaps a new party of conservatives, splitting off from Congress membership, would be an opposition group on the other end.

Prospects of Communists

If the Socialists decide to remain in the wilderness, however, refusing to accept political responsibility, then instead of a strong middle group, India would face a sharp polarization between Congress and Communists, with the Socialists reduced to impotence or absorbed on an individual basis by one or the other of the two poles.

Heretofore the victories won by the Communists have been at the expense of the Socialists; recently, however, the Communists have made inroads into the Congress vote. This was made dramatically clear in the state of Kerala. There a highly literate and politically conscious but impoverished population, containing many Catholics, voted to oust Congress leaders in a democratic election and gave a slender margin to a Communist government. In Kerala, where the Communists denounced the previous leaders as corrupt and inefficient, they face a significant test. If they go too fast, and show a predilection for dictatorship, they may easily lose any hope of playing a role on the national stage. Yet if the Communists act in a spirit of moderation, they may find that they are no more capable than Congress of delivering on promises of far-reaching reforms.

Two New Factors

Meanwhile, two new factors have emerged. At one end of the spectrum Chakravarti Rajagopalachariar, for-

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Haiti — Behind the Turmoil

by Bernard Diederich

Mr. Diederich is the publisher-editor of the *Haiti Sun* and frequently contributes articles to *The New York Times*.

The Haitian election of September 22 followed more than eight months of revolutionary turmoil, near civil war and near anarchy. The Negro republic of more than 3 million people was at the end ruled by a military junta and brought close to financial bankruptcy.

Many Americans may be inclined to shrug these happenings off as just another example of Latin American revolts that will sooner or later settle down into inactivity once the volcano has relieved itself. Yet the fact remains that what has been happening in Haiti is of more than passing importance.

A Political Vacuum

Superficially, a political vacuum existed in Haiti which was the natural sequence of events following the departure of an authoritarian regime, that of General Paul E. Magloire, which ended December 13, 1956. However, in the post-Magloire Haiti, all of the main aspirant factions have become more or less equally balanced in political strength.

Haiti has grown accustomed to passing quickly from one regime to another via the revolutionary route. With no single group strong enough to seize power at the fall of the Magloire regime, and with the Army for the first time declaring a policy of political neutrality, there followed a political dogfight which, except for short pauses for breath, lasted almost three quarters of a year. In that time the country had three provisional presidents and two governments by an executive council nominated by

the leading candidates. Later the Army held the reins of government and recently imposed strict censorship regulations.

Following a day of civil war, in which Army units clashed briefly and civilian rioters spread terror in the streets, the Army took over, and a three-man junta replaced the provisional president, who had emerged from the fighting only to attempt the same old dodge of trying to ensure his "election."

An important factor in this political seesawing was the demand for "free, honest" elections. Perhaps the very fact that the parties were more or less evenly balanced also led to considerable thinking along evolutionary rather than revolutionary lines. Haiti has never had "free and honest" elections. It was the first time, too, that the president as well as the congress was to be elected by universal suffrage. It was the first time that women voted in a general election. The over-all effect was to make the country politically conscious—a process which heightened as the campaigning drew itself out.

Without the experience of democratic elections, and handicapped by the tradition of revolutionary action, the country has no machinery either for providing a nonpolitical transition administration or for carrying out democratic elections in a country that is 90 percent illiterate.

There is no permanent civil service. The whole government service—from the highest official to the lowliest errand boy—is likely to change (and often does) with the political

party in power. As a result, the procedure has been, first, to capture the temporary administration, install one's own machine and then proceed to "free, honest" elections. Without a permanent civil service secure enough to be nonpartisan, free and honest elections in Haiti have been almost impossible. Moreover, the present electoral machinery and system provide so great an opportunity for the exercise of duress and fraud that it is also difficult to see how honest elections can take place, even with a politically honest administration. The question of the ballot's being secret is not regarded as important in a country where political reprisal has continually robbed it of some of its best brains.

Election Problems

It would be comparatively simple, of course, if one could get the factions together, to use symbols, which would solve the problem of illiteracy, and indelible ink to prevent plural voting. With these safeguards the ballot could then be made secret, and representatives of the candidates could no longer provide the voters with ready-made ballots. Up to now, however, no such agreement among the factions has been possible—for obvious reasons.

Because of all this the situation in Haiti today is that of a country financially and emotionally exhausted by the events of the past eight months, but it is also at a point at which the revolutionary psychology may be said to be in balance with the evolutionary. The forces are almost equal.

The Army, as the only career public organization in the country, recruited on merit and secure in tenure, is equipped to perform the functions of a civil service. But the Army, after all, is still a police force and in that sense has not the confidence of the people. A majority accept it as the choice between two evils and a temporary administration with the best chance of providing reasonably free elections. It is indeed possible that, in principle, the Army alone can provide the machinery necessary for fulfilling the requirements of democratic elections. However, the recent censorship decrees, imposed by the governing Army junta before the last election, stand as evidence to the contrary.

The suggestion was that a United Nations team of experts should have observed at the elections. But this was impossible without the consent of at least the majority of the Haitian people, and there was no way of arriving at this. There was a great deal of outcry against the suggestion, and it was regarded as incompatible with the dignity of the country.

Need for Aid

One consideration which could affect political stability concerns United States assistance. All Haiti looks to the United States to provide further financial assistance for the development of the country and especially in this difficult period.

Seen as a straight business proposition, Haiti is in the position of a businessman who finds himself temporarily embarrassed and seeks assistance from a bank. The prospective borrower, however, has to satisfy the bank not only that the assistance given would place him in the position of repaying the loan but also that the business is well organized and efficiently run so that the assistance granted would do the work it is in-

tended to do. At present Haiti is in no position to give such guarantees.

A Social Revolution

All the foregoing may be regarded as the symptoms of a much deeper problem. Fundamentally it is a social revolution, which may have profound effects on this area. Haiti, the first country in the Western Hemisphere after the United States to achieve independence, is now probably the last to feel the effects of the social revolution that has been sweeping the Caribbean over the past 20 years. What emerges from Haiti's revolution can be of considerable significance to the United States in its relations not only with the other American republics but with the European nations which have interests in this strategic basin.

Haiti is in a position of peculiar importance to the United States. A glance at the map of the Caribbean reveals its strategic position with regard to the United States mainland and the Panama Canal. A closer look shows its proximity to two of the most politically sensitive spots in the Caribbean — the Republic of Cuba and the British island of Jamaica.

Cuba's position in the United States scheme of hemisphere defense is well defined. The sensitivity of Jamaica lies in the fact that this island — like Haiti, predominantly Negro — is the linchpin of the prospective British West Indian Federation stretching 1200 miles from Barbados to the coast of South America. This federation is expected to achieve independent Commonwealth status within the next five years. It follows that with independence this Commonwealth area will seek closer links with the United States.

Obviously, therefore, United States policy toward Latin America will be influenced increasingly by the emergence of new nations in the Carib-

bean — especially nations racially linked with Haiti, at present the only independent nation of this stock in the area. Conversely, too, these new nations cannot help feeling the impact of events in their neighborhood, and especially among people linked together by ties of blood if not of language.

What, then, is the nature of the social revolution now taking place in Haiti, and what are the probable courses of development?

Economically, Haiti is the poorest and one of the most densely populated countries in the Caribbean. Its per capita income has been put at \$65.00 a year. Its population pressure of 300 persons to the square mile is accentuated by the fact that most of the country is mountainous or consists of sadly eroded hill areas.

The French Heritage

Politically, Haiti has developed along the Latin American pattern of paternal authoritarian rule. But there is an essential difference between Haiti and its Latin American neighbors. There are cultural ties with France, maintained by the bond of language, which have also isolated Haitians from their Spanish- and English-speaking neighbors. These developments, with the dominant part played by the French Revolution in the history of their fight for independence, have made Haitians fiercely individualistic.

While they accept authoritarian rule, their almost fanatical loyalty to the ideals of the French Revolution keeps them in a state of constant rebellion against the very authoritarian rule to which periodically they are driven by their uncompromising individualism. Hating dictatorship, Haitians find themselves continually setting up dictatorships, only to knock them down again. This historical contradiction of character has

had its effect on the economics of the country over the 150 years of its independence.

In terms of production, Haiti, still mainly agricultural, is poorer today than it was a century and a half ago. Because of this the social structure has tended to stratify to a far greater extent than among its Latin American neighbors. There is still a vast chasm between the less than 2 percent of the population who form its social and economic elite and the 90 percent of its struggling, poverty-stricken, illiterate peasantry eking a bare living out of ill-husbanded soil, estimated by the United Nations Mission in 1948 at "less than one acre of tillable land per person."

Yet with all this, Haitians are probably the most cultured people in the Caribbean. The ebullieny of their art-forms, even among peasant artificers, has been a delight and wonder to many non-Haitians. If it is true that a civilization builds museums for its culture, then perhaps one approaches the essential problem of Haiti today. Their culture is approaching the museum stage.

A New Middle Class

Over the past ten years, under the impact of world events, the stratification of the Haitian social milieu has been crumbling. But the nub of the problem is that, as in most underdeveloped countries, Haiti's economy has not expanded at anything approaching the same rate as its cultural and educational upsurge. A middle class, by culture and education, has been emerging. But the economy of the country has failed to provide opportunities for any but a small percentage to settle into the true role of their class.

The result is that thousands of educationally qualified Haitians, potentially the core of an essential middle-class bridge, remain suspended in

frustration, as it were, between two worlds. It is this class today which will determine the immediate future of Haiti, depending on whether it wins or loses the battle for economic security. Is it any wonder then that non-Haitians tend to regard these charming and talented people as submerged in an emotional mystique which defies interpretation and makes the political symptoms so confusing?

Guides for U.S. Policy

Yet the turmoil and confusion of the past eight months reveal certain hopeful signs, which, if read correctly, could be a guide in the formulation of United States foreign policy toward this area.

The most important sign is the gradual emergence of political parties. At present they are factions rather than parties, and the cult of the personality is still strong. But the political seesaw has focused attention increasingly on methods rather than men. The long-established ruling caste has been forced to modify the Bourbon outlook it inherited from French colonial days, and with the breaching of the bastions of privilege the emerging middle class is seeking direction. This has resulted in the changing of the emotional concept of the idealism of the French Revolution to the more practical realities of democratic interchange.

These developments are of supreme importance. Aside from those Caribbean units, such as Puerto Rico and the British, French and Dutch West Indies, which have had long tutelage in democracy, Haiti today is one of the few Latin American countries that has generated a dynamic for democracy which at this moment could be put to work. The difficulty lies in building the machinery. The spirit is willing, but in the face of the

hard struggle for existence the flesh is very weak.

The whole constitutional and administrative system of Haiti needs recasting. There is an urgent desire among the people for this reorganization. But the task is too great for any group of Haitians as they are at present constituted. To attempt the reforms necessary—and some of them were well-defined in the report of the UN Technical Mission—would entail so much sacrifice under the country's prevailing economic conditions that any group which attempts it would be overthrown within a short time.

Yet these reforms are necessary. It is also necessary for the United States, pledged as it is to the propagation of democracy throughout the Western Hemisphere, to seize an opportunity that could be the first step in freeing its foreign policy from the embarrassment of having to support dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere despite that pledge.

The days of dollar diplomacy are past, but given the circumstances it should not be beyond the wit of Americans to devise a way of providing means by which the dynamic now being released by the social revolution taking place in Haiti could be turned into constructive channels.

Twin Needs

The urgent need of Haiti today is the same as that of all the underdeveloped areas. Ways must be found of expanding the economy of the country, and that quickly, in order to provide at least a safety valve for the energy being generated by the social ferment. With economic relief must come the building of a constitutional and administrative machine flexible enough to adapt itself to the needs of a people still maturing politically but firm enough to with-

stand the shocks which are inevitable.

Until these twin pillars are firmly erected, Haiti will have liberty without freedom, equality without social justice, and fraternity without brotherly love. Yet, unless they are erected, the United States may one day soon be faced with a situation in the Caribbean which it would find difficult to defend in terms of modern political concepts.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Most of the literature on Haiti has naturally appeared in French, the language of the country. The following titles in English are of interest: *Mission to Haiti*, a report of the United Nations Mission of Technical Assistance to the Republic of Haiti (New York, Columbia University Press, 1949); *The Haitian People*, by J. G. Leyburn (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941); and *Here Is Haiti*, by R. D. Wilson (New York, Philosophical Library, 1957). Related, more general books on the Caribbean area include: *The Traveller's Tree*, by P. L. Fermor (New York, Harper, 1950); and *The Caribbean: Peoples, Problems, and Prospects*, edited by A. C. Wilgus (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1952).

Spotlight

(Continued from page 12)

mer governor general of India from 1948 to 1950 and respected elder statesman, advocates the creation of a conservative party recruited from rightist elements. Such a party, in his opinion, is the only practicable alternative to Congress, which he contends has moved very far to the left. It is doubtful, however, that a rightist party could win much public support or fulfill the election pledges it

would have to make—particularly since Rajagopalacharia would limit the powers of the central government to defense and foreign affairs.

At the other end, the Nehru government appears to be seeking the cooperation of the Communists for "coexistence" at home. On August 16 President Rajendra Prasad, an orthodox Hindu, in his Independence Day address praised the Communist government of Kerala for "grappling with the state's problems with enthusiasm and in a spirit of service." And on August 19 it was announced that the president, Prime Minister Nehru and Vinoba Bhave would confer with Congress, Socialist and Communist leaders on rural implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan. This involves decisions about the creation of farm cooperatives, which it is feared might turn out to be collective farms.

Some observers are wondering whether these moves will lead to the creation of a Popular Front, where differences between parties would be soft-pedaled for the sake of speeding national consolidation and development. If this should happen, they ask, will the Communist party come out on top—the tiger "with the lady (Nehru) inside, and a smile on the face of the tiger"—or will the traditional Indian spirit of conciliation bring about a synthesis between so-

cialism and communism, with the prime minister still the unchallenged leader?

India's prospects for continuing on its present middle course and avoiding extremism depend on the success it can achieve in strengthening its economy under the Second Five-Year Plan, whose outcome is bound to affect the next general elections in 1962.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the first of three articles on current trends in India.)

FPA Bookshelf

Egypt's Role in World Affairs, by Emil Lengyel. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1957. \$2.50.

Placing Egypt in the power vacuum of the Middle East, Professor Lengyel details in this book how the Nasser regime in Cairo is attempting to fill that void through emphasis on Arab unity and challenge to the West. He also deals with the Israeli-Arab problem and the Suez Canal controversy. The author has written other books on the Middle East and East Europe and is a contributor to the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN as well.

Governments of Latin America, by William W. Pierson and Federico G. Gil. New York, Toronto and London, McGraw-Hill, 1956, \$6.50.

The two authors of this text on Latin American political institutions, both professors at the University of North Carolina, present in this book a topical and comparative study of the governments of the 20 republics of Latin America. Attention is given to the colonial background and revolutionary period in Latin America. Views of Latin Americans themselves about their governments are also dealt with.

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